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I. Introduction 
During the early 1990s, many emerging market economies in Asia and Latin America 
experienced massive capital inflows, favoured by structural reforms and improvements in 
macroeconomic management. Although the higher degree of financial integration brought 
many benefits, the capital inflows resulted in overheating and increased vulnerability to 
financial crises, which led in some cases to sudden reversals of capital flows. 
In recent years, the high level of global liquidity and favourable economic conditions 
achieved via improved macroeconomic management have generated massive capital inflows 
to emerging market economies. Peru has also experienced significant capital inflows, 
especially in foreign direct investment (FDI), contributing to economic growth and 
development possibilities, but also creating downward pressures on the exchange rate. The 
strength of the fiscal position, with sustained primary surpluses and the de-dollarisation of the 
financial system, has helped neutralise the side effects of capital inflows and allowed the 
monetary authorities to respond through sterilised interventions without endangering the 
inflation targeting regime. 
This paper analyses the macroeconomic effects of the 2000s episode of capital inflows and 
compares it with the episode of the 1990s. It also evaluates policy measures implemented in 
order to reduce the impact of abrupt reversals of capital flows.  
II.  Capital flows in Peru 
Emerging market economies in general, and Peru in particular, were recently experiencing 
significant capital inflows, due to high levels of global liquidity and favourable economic 
conditions reflecting better macroeconomic management and the stimulus of previously 
implemented structural reforms. However, this episode of capital inflows is different to the 
one experienced during the 1990s, as it was spread across a larger number of countries with 
solid current account positions, in a context of a higher degree of financial integration. 
However, along with the benefits of increased financing, capital inflows can also cause 
negative effects resulting in an overheated economy, exchange rate pressures and greater 
vulnerability to financial crisis. European emerging market economies have received large 
capital inflows in recent years. These flows were initially made up mainly by foreign direct 
investment; however, portfolio inflows, especially those oriented towards the acquisition of 
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debt securities, have become more important over time. These large inflows were stimulated 
by country-specific factors such as large interest rate differentials, large-scale privatisation 
programmes, sound and credible macroeconomic policies and enhanced economic 
prospects, as mentioned by Ötker-Robe et al (2007). Even though capital inflows provide 
economic benefits, large portfolio inflows may challenge macroeconomic management 
through their effects on exchange rates and liquidity; therefore, authorities need to make 
careful use of interest rate and intervention policies to avoid disorderly exchange rate 
adjustments and preserve the credibility of their monetary policy regimes. 
Structural reforms and capital inflows: 1993–96 
Improvements in macroeconomic management achieved through stabilisation programmes 
and structural reforms implemented during the early 1990s generated a massive flow of 
foreign capital to emerging market economies, and especially to Asia and Latin America. 
Despite their benefits, capital inflows overheated the expansion of aggregate demand in 
these economies and increased their vulnerability to a financial crisis. International volatility 
in a context of fragile domestic financial systems led to a fast reversal of capital flows in the 
late 1990s, which generated sharp depreciations and contractionary effects in these 
economies. 
Similarly, Peru also experienced a rapid increase in capital inflows in the early 1990s, after a 
series of structural reforms implemented together with a stabilisation programme. This 
experience is described by Castillo and Barco (2008). 
After a decade of high inflation and persistent output contractions, in 1990 the Peruvian 
government implemented a drastic stabilisation programme and structural reforms to attain 
macroeconomic stability and to encourage sustainable economic growth. The improved 
institutional arrangements set a new legal framework with price stability as the only monetary 
policy objective and established central bank autonomy in order to achieve it. These 
measures helped to lower inflation from 7,482% in 1990 to 6.5% in 1997. Structural reforms 
associated with the deregulation of the financial system and capital liberalisation also allowed 
the economy to access the international financial markets and generate fresh capital inflows 
which helped to increase the economy’s productive capacity. The output growth rate 
increased from –5.1% in 1990 to 5.3% in 1997. 
The environment of increasing monetary stability and sustainable output growth after the 
implementation of the structural reforms attracted capital inflows. Between 1991 and 1997, 
net private capital inflows were, on average, 5.8% of GDP, concentrated mainly on the long-
term segment. 
Capital outflows after the Russian crisis 
Macroeconomic impact 
The Peruvian economy experienced two main shocks during the late 1990s. The first one 
was a reduction in the terms of trade, after the decrease in worldwide demand for 
commodities following the Asian crisis. Even though this shock did not have a significant 
effect on investment or consumption, there was a sharp reduction in short-term capital flows. 
However, the Russian and Brazilian crises of 1998 and 1999 caused significant outflows of 
short-term capital from emerging economies, including Peru. The EMBI indicator for Latin 
America jumped from 657 to 967 basis points between August and September 1998, while in 
the case of Peru, it rose from 680 to 914 basis points. The outflows quickly impacted the 
financial system and the foreign exchange market. 
Short-term capital flows switched from an inflow of USD 649 million in 1998 to an outflow of 
USD 808 million after the financial crises, while FDI slightly increased from USD 1,582 million BIS Papers No 44  365
 
 
to USD 1,812 million during the same period. Similarly, other Latin American countries also 
showed a sharp decrease in short-term capital flows, while long-term capital inflows 
remained relatively steady. 
 
Table 1 
Private capital flows 
As a percentage of GDP 
1998  1999 
 
FDI  Portfolio, 
net 
Other,  




Argentina  1.7 2.9 1.1 7.8  –2.4  –0.2 
Bolivia  11.1 –0.9  2.5 12.2 –0.7 –2.2 
Brazil  3.5  2.2 –3.3  4.6  0.6 –3.9 
Chile 4.0  –3.1  1.8  8.5  –4.4  –3.6 
Colombia 2.1  1.2  –0.2  1.6  –0.7  –2.5 
Paraguay  4.2 0.1 1.0 1.2  –0.1  –0.7 
Peru 2.8  –0.7  1.1  3.5  –0.7  –1.6 
Uruguay  0.7 1.9  –0.7 1.1 0.4  –1.4 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
 
The wave of capital outflows put the exchange rate and money markets under pressure. The 
pressures were absorbed through a sharp increase in interest rates.  
Financial conditions deteriorated with the reversal in short-term capital flows. The increase in 
interest rates and the nominal exchange rate depreciation generated a decrease in credit 
growth, accompanied by a decline in economic activity. The growth rate of credit from the 
banking system to the private sector dropped from 24% in 1997 to 14% in 1998, while output 
growth decreased from 6.9% in 1997 to –0.7% in 1998.  
Even though the pattern of capital flows was similar to those observed in other South 
American economies, Peru experienced a lower reduction in output growth as well as a 
smaller real foreign exchange depreciation. Peru had a high level of international reserves, 
which helped to provide the banking sector with foreign currency liquidity during the liquidity 
shortage period. The lower reduction in GDP growth was also related to some extent to 
countercyclical fiscal policy, as the overall fiscal balance deteriorated from a surplus in 1997 
to a deficit of 3% of GDP in 2000, and the investment in the tradable sector during the pre-
crisis period allowed for increases in production capacity, especially in the mining and 
agricultural sectors.  
Policy responses to capital outflows 
This episode of financial turmoil and increases in country risk led to a USD  987  million 
outflow of short-term capital in the fourth quarter of 1998, which generated interest rate and 
exchange rate variability. The initial policy response was to avoid a sharp depreciation of the 
domestic currency because of the balance sheet effects of a large depreciation in highly 
dollarised economies like Peru. As mentioned initially, the central bank allowed an increase 
in the short-term interest rate from 25% in July 1998 to 39% two months later. In the medium 366  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
term, the shock was absorbed through a 20% nominal depreciation of the exchange rate, 
while the interest rate fell back to 16.9% (Graph 1). After a short time, the authorities 
reoriented their policies towards the provision of foreign currency liquidity to the banking 
system.  
Graph 1 
Interbank interest rate, 1997–98 












Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
Some of the policy measures implemented were: 
Monetary policy measures 
a.  Credit facilities in foreign currency. The central bank opened a window for short-term 
credit in foreign currency as from 2 September 1998, in order to offset the short-run 
foreign currency liquidity restriction. 
b.  Reduction of the average and marginal reserve requirements on foreign currency 
deposits. Starting on 8 September 1998, the average reserve requirement on 
foreign currency deposits was reduced by 4.5 percentage points, through a series of 
1.5 percentage point monthly reductions. This measure allowed the provision of 
foreign currency liquidity for USD 420 million. In addition, the marginal reserve 
requirement on foreign currency deposits was reduced from 35% to 20% in 
December 1998.  
c.  Foreign exchange interventions. 
Against a backdrop of devaluation expectations and higher exchange rate volatility, the central 
bank restricted its purchases of foreign currency. Net purchases, including operations with the 
public sector, fell from USD 1,191 million in 1997 to a negative value of USD 639 million in 
1998, considering the sale of USD 83 million in the foreign exchange market in September 1998. 
Government and supervisory measures 
d.  Conversion of foreign currency public deposits to domestic currency. This measure 
provided foreign currency liquidity to the private sector, while also increasing the 
domestic currency resources of banks. These resources were used to increase the 
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quarter of 1998, partially offsetting the reduction in credit in foreign currency of 
USD 303 million. 
e.  Temporary purchases of banks’ portfolios. There were two programmes for 
temporary purchases of banks’ asset portfolios, for a total of USD 427 million, where 
banks were required to repurchase their portfolios at a discount rate of 20% in the 
following five years. They also committed to a net worth strengthening programme 
through the injection of new capital.  
After the macroeconomic adjustment had taken place, the Peruvian authorities implemented 
several policy measures to guarantee the solvency of the banking system, including: 
a.  A net worth consolidation programme (creation of a fund for temporary capitalisation 
of banks); 
b.  A financial system consolidation programme (incentives for mergers); 
c.  A programme for financial rescue of agricultural companies and a programme for 
net worth consolidation of commercial companies; 
d.  Provision requirements (provisions based on the risk quality of banks’ assets); 
e.  Limits to banks’ global positions in foreign currency (a 100% limit (of capital?) on the 
overbought position and a 2.5% limit (of capital?) on the oversold position). 
Between 1998 and 2001 the number of banks in Peru decreased from 25 to 15 due to the 
liquidation of nine banks and the merger of three, while two new banks started operations in 
1998 and 1999, respectively. The total fiscal cost of the banking crisis is estimated at 2.1% of 
GDP.
5 
Policy measures adopted to confront the reversal of capital flows allowed for a quick reversal 
of the banking sector liquidity shortage. The low depreciation of the real exchange rate, 
compared to other Latin American countries, limited the deterioration of banks’ assets in 
Peru’s highly dollarised economy, and helped to neutralise the drop in GDP growth.  
Countercyclical fiscal policy helped the economy by reducing the government deficit during 
the period of large capital inflows and by using these resources to increase public 
expenditure after the sudden stop. As a result, there was less overheating in GDP growth 
during the capital inflow period and a soft landing was possible after the reversal of capital 
flows. 
Another feature that bolstered the resilience of the Peruvian economy’s long-term 
macroeconomic prospects was the persistence of FDI during the financial crisis, which 
maintained an average value of 2.7% of GDP between 1998 and 2002.  
Macroeconomic stability and capital inflows: 2002–07 
During the last few years there has been a gradual recovery in private capital inflows since 
the minimum reached in 2003, mainly in the form of FDI, favoured by the stable 
macroeconomic environment of price stability, fiscal discipline and financial solvency 
(Graph 2). 
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Net private capital inflows 
As a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru.  
 
Table 2 
1993–97 1998–2001 2002–07 
 
Average Volatility Average Volatility Average Volatility 
FDI 4.8  0.43  2.5  0.36  3.3  0.31 
Other long-term  1.4  0.17  0.3  2.26  –0.6  3.39 
Short-term 1.3  1.34  –1.0  1.43  0.0  ... 
Total 7.5  0.27  1.8  0.65  2.8  1.32 
Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
 
During the last five years, the Peruvian economy has been experiencing a sustained 
expansion of economic activity, reaching GDP growth rates of 7.6% in 2006 and 9.0% in 
2007, accompanied by a similar trend of domestic demand. In particular, private consumption 
and private investment have shown a faster pace of growth, reflecting consumer and 
business optimism in a context of increased disposable income due to higher terms of trade 
and employment growth. Since 2002, output growth has been much more stable than during 
the first wave of capital inflows of the mid-1990s. In fact, the volatility of GDP growth 
decreased from 49% (measured by the ratio of the standard deviation to its average) during 
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Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
 
Table 3 
GDP growth volatility 
 1993–97  1998–2001  2002–07 
Average GDP growth  7.12  0.86  6.24 
Variability  0.49 1.56 0.27 
Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru calculations, author calculations. 
 
Another characteristic of the current scenario is the important increase in the terms of trade, which 
has been translated into a progressive improvement in the current account, reaching surpluses in 
the last two years. The favourable evolution in the price of exports has led to an increase in profits 
and reinvestments, giving an extra impulse to FDI during the last few years (Graph 4).  
Graph 4 
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The first wave of capital inflows (1993–97) coincided with the privatisation process, stimulating FDI 
inflows; thus during this period FDI averaged 4.8% of GDP, 2.0% of which represented 
privatisation inflows. FDI then declined during the period of financial and political crisis, mainly due 
to the end of the privatisation process, but to a much lesser extent than other flows (2.5% on 
average). During 2002–07 FDI recovered its pace, reaching an average of 3.3% of GDP (Graph 5).  
Graph 5  
Foreign direct investment 
As a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
Capital inflows show a hike in 2007, again due mainly to FDI flows, accompanied also by 
long- and short-term debt, reversing the negative pattern shown since the end of the last 
decade. The current figures are different from those of 1997 since the current share of non-
FDI inflows is low. In 1997 short-term flows were the largest component, reaching 4.2% of 
GDP (FDI accounted for only 3.5% of GDP), while in 2007 they represented only 1.9% of 
GDP (FDI: 4.9%, Graph 6). Therefore, financial and macroeconomic vulnerability due to 
capital inflows is much lower than in previous episodes. 
Graph 6 
Net capital inflows 
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Identifying the determinants of capital inflows 
In the literature on capital inflows, researchers have examined the determinants of particular 
types of capital flows, distinguishing between short- and long-term flows. Most of the work on 
this topic analyses the presence of country-specific and external determinants. Some earlier 
approaches suggested that capital inflows to developing countries depend mostly on the 
business cycle of the developed world, with a decline in investment returns in developed 
countries causing investors to seek higher returns in emerging market economies. However, 
as shown by Montiel and Reinhart (1999), the distribution of capital inflows between 
emerging economies depends on country-specific factors. 
In these approaches, the arbitrage factor, measured by the difference in returns between 
domestic and foreign currency assets, is expected to have a positive relationship with capital 
inflows. In the specific case of long-term capital inflows, indicators associated with 
macroeconomic stability will encourage an increase in capital inflows, especially of longer 
terms. Therefore, proper economic institutional arrangements associated with price stability, 
fiscal discipline and a sound financial system should attract longer-term capital inflows, 
principally foreign direct investment. 
In order to identify the determinants of capital inflows in Peru, we first use a cointegration 
analysis on capital inflows following the work done by Ocampo and Tovar (2003). They 
examine the effect of regulation of capital flows in Colombia. The estimation is based on a 
ortfolio framework model, which considers the interest rate parity condition, controlling for 
reserve requirements in foreign currency. We then extend this approach by including 
indicators of macroeconomic stability. 
For the first estimation we consider two types of interest rate differentials: (1) the spread 
between the domestic interbank interest rate and the US federal funds rate, and (2) the 
arbitrage factor, as represented by the spread of equivalent term deposit rates in Peru and 
the United States. The estimate takes into account reserve requirements on foreign 
borrowing implemented since October 2004 and the variation in the nominal exchange rate. 
The maturities considered for the arbitrage factor are one, two and three years.  
In addition, we include an economic activity variable, proxied for by imports of capital goods, 
and control for the effect on total volume of reversals of capital flows during the Asian, 
Russian and Brazilian crises. In the case of Peru, although there is a ceiling on the foreign 
investments of private pension funds (set as a percentage of the total value of the fund), 
foreign investment by these funds accounts for a significant proportion of capital outflows 
from this country. Therefore, the value of these funds is considered in the regression 
analysis. 
Using Johansen’s maximum likelihood cointegration analysis, we estimate the following 
relationship: 
t t t t t D Z Z Z ε + Ψ + Π + Δ Γ + μ = Δ − − 1 1 1  
where Zt considers the two indicators on interest rate differentials, imports of capital goods 
and the value of the private pension funds, and Dt includes the dummies for financial crises. 
The equilibrium relationship shows that, for all the maturities considered in the analysis, there 
is a high response of net capital inflows to the arbitrage factor. In the case of short-term 
interest rate differentials, although we obtain the expected positive sign, it is statistically 




Dependent variable: Private capital flows 
Sample: 1994.01–2007.02 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 
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The cointegration analysis proves the existence of one long-term equilibrium relationship 
between net private capital flows, interest rate differentials, imports of capital goods and the 
foreign investment of the country’s private pension funds. The error correction term indicates 
a rise in the speed of adjustment of any disequilibria by capital flows as the maturity of the 
arbitrage factor increases. 
In the second set of estimations we centre our attention on the determinants of long-term 
capital flows, incorporating as explanatory variables indicators that assess Peru’s 
macroeconomic performance in terms of monetary policy soundness, fiscal discipline and 
financial sector health. 
The primary balance of the fiscal sector is used as an indicator of the fiscal position, the 
inflation rate as an indicator of monetary policy soundness and the non-performing loans 
ratio as an inverse indicator of financial sector strength. Decreasing inflation, a lower ratio of 
non-performing loans and an improving overall balance of the public sector provided an 
environment of macroeconomic stability that contributed to lower short-term capital flows to 
Peru and instead attracted foreign direct investment. The three equations differ from each 
other in that they include a different maturity for the arbitrage factor, for 12, 24 and 36 
months, respectively. The results for the three equations are similar, in both sign and 
magnitude; however, the ratio of non-performing loans is not statistically at all. The 
estimations excluding the non-performing loans ratio show similar results to those shown in 




Dependent variable: Long-term private capital flows 
Sample: 1994.01–2007.02 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 
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The results suggest that sound institutional economic arrangements enhance longer-term 
capital inflows such as foreign direct investment. This may explain the relative persistence of 
such flows to Peru over the whole estimation period. 
Recent experience with the derivatives market 
The derivatives market has also gone through important developments during the last few 
years in Peru. The forward foreign exchange market is actually the most important market, 
where non-resident investors (the main players in this market) make non-deliverable contracts. 
Since 2006 the forward market has shown a high degree of volatility (Graph 7). From 2003 to 
2005 the net balance of forward purchases was around USD –700 million, covering the risk 
of new sol depreciation (future purchases of dollars at a predetermined exchange rate). 
Political uncertainty as presidential elections approached at the end of 2005 was reflected in 
financial markets, in particular in the foreign exchange market. The net balance of forward 
purchases more than doubled from its normal levels, to USD –1,700 by mid-2006. As the 
forward market is not organised, banks hedged the forward contract risk in the spot market 




Net balance of forward purchases and the exchange rate 
 
Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
After the political uncertainty was resolved, the forward market changed rapidly, switching 
from reflecting the risk of depreciation to reflecting the risk of appreciation (future purchases 
of new soles at a predetermined exchange rate). Thus the net balance of forward purchases 
amounted to USD 1,075 million in May 2007, a swing of USD 2,700 million over the 
preceding 12 months; this amount represents more than 10% of the central bank’s net 
international reserves (NIR). These drastic changes introduced more volatility into the 
exchange market. 
III.   Policy responses to capital inflows 
Rationale for international reserve accumulation in dollarised economies 
The Central Reserve Bank of Peru has a fully fledged inflation targeting regime with a point 
target of 2% and a tolerance range of ±1%. This target reflects the central bank’s 
commitment to monetary stability. In order to attain this objective, the central bank constantly 
evaluates indicators of inflationary pressure, and based on its quarterly forecasting model 
decides the level of the reference rate for the interbank money market that brings the inflation 



















































Over the first five years of implementation of inflation targeting, the average annual inflation 
rate has been 2.0%, with a standard deviation of 1.3 percentage points, which shows that 
inflation has been within the target range (between 1.5 and 3.5%) in this period. Moreover, 
inflation has been within the target range in 73% of the last 50 months under the inflation 
targeting regime (November 2002–December 2006, excluding the initial convergence from a 
0% inflation rate towards the target range during January–October 2002).  
The second pillar of the monetary policy framework consists of measures to control the risks 
associated with financial dollarisation. The main risks of a dollarised economy are related to 
the liquidity and solvency of the financial system:
6  
•  Liquidity risks are associated with maturity mismatches, considering the short-term 
liabilities and long-term assets that characterise commercial banks’ balance sheets. 
Even though this is common to any banking system, in an economy with financial 
dollarisation the maturity mismatch generated in foreign currency introduces higher 
liquidity risks considering that the central bank does not issue that currency.  
•  Solvency risks occur because economic agents’ income is denominated in domestic 
currency, while debts are dollar-denominated. This generates a currency-related 
credit risk because a sharp depreciation of the domestic currency reduces the 
repayment capacity of agents.  
To deal with these risks, the BCRP limits balance sheet effects by pre-emptive accumulation 
of reserves and by moderating the volatility of the exchange rate. To avoid moral hazard it 
also requires that commercial banks hold large liquid reserves against their foreign currency 
liabilities. In addition, it promotes voluntary financial de-dollarisation and encourages 
economic agents to internalise financial dollarisation risks.  
In line with this framework, international reserves increased from USD 9,598 million in 2002 














Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
                                                  
6   See Gulde et al (2004). 
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Indicators of international liquidity 
In general, foreign exchange accumulation must be consistent with prudent levels of 
international reserves. One of the most used indicators is the Guidotti-Greenspan indicator, 
which takes into account a sudden stop of capital inflows into the economy, so foreign 
reserves should at least cover the short-term liabilities. Currently, international reserves 
represent 3.5 times Peru’s short-term external liabilities.  
 
Table 7 
International liquidity indicators 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
NIR/short-term 
external liabilities  1.29 1.15 1.25 1.50 1.46 2.11 2.14 1.97 2.77 3.55 3.46 
NIR/short-term 
external liabilities 
 + foreign currency 
broad money   0.60  0.54  0.53  0.56  0.60 0.74 0.78 0.83 0.95 1.08 1.31 
Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
 
However, this indicator does not take into account the risks facing a dollarised economy, as 
foreign currency deposits show a higher volatility than domestic currency deposits during 
turmoil periods. A modified Guidotti-Greenspan indicator can be built by adding domestic 
deposits in foreign currency and the short-term liabilities. The new indicator shows that net 
international reserves have been roughly in line during the last three years. 
Assessing the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention 
Sterilised intervention affects the exchange rate through the portfolio channel and the 
signalling channel. As domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes, sterilised 
interventions will alter the relative supply of domestic assets, and therefore the composition 
of investors’ portfolios. This will generate an increase in the return of domestic assets, which 
will lead to a depreciation of the exchange rate. The second channel, which works through 
the signalling process, operates if foreign exchange intervention signals the future direction 
of monetary policy. For the signalling channel to be strong, central bank intervention must be 
consistent with changes in the stance of monetary policy. 
In order to analyse the effect of foreign exchange intervention on the exchange rate, we 
performed a volatility analysis, through generalised autoregressive conditional hetero-
skedasticity (GARCH) models with daily data for the period between 2004 and 2007, when 
the Central Reserve Bank of Peru actively intervened in the foreign exchange market. This 
model considers the effect of intervention on both exchange rate returns and volatility. 
Previous work on exchange rate volatility has been done by Dominguez (1998) to analyse 
the effect of interventions by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan on the 
volatility of the mark and the yen respectively.  
In the mean level estimation, we consider the variation between the exchange rate at the 
opening of the exchange rate market and the closing level of the previous day, as an 
indicator of appreciatory or depreciatory pressures in the market. In addition, we include an 
asymmetric effect of the conditional exchange rate volatility, measured by a variability 
coefficient that has been constructed using conditional variability. BIS Papers No 44  377
 
 
In the variance estimation, we consider a GARCH (1,1) specification. The Exponential-
GARCH (E-GARCH) model was also tested, but there was no evidence of an asymmetric 
effect in the variance equation for the period under analysis. 
In both equations, we include the interest rate differential to account for arbitrage 
opportunities that will generate pressures on the exchange rate, and the investor’s risk 
perception of the domestic economy, measured through the EMBI index. In order to test for 
the effectiveness of intervention, the estimation contains a variable that takes three values  
(–1, 0 or 1) if the central bank sells dollars, does not intervene on the market or purchases 
dollars, respectively. 
By examining the results for the exchange rate mean level equation, it can be observed that 
there is no significant effect of a decision to intervene in the foreign exchange market in 
terms of either appreciation or depreciation of the currency, suggesting that intervention does 
not change the path of the exchange rate. However, intervention decisions do have a 
significant impact in terms of reducing extreme exchange rate volatility. This result supports a 
credible commitment by the central bank to reducing excessive volatility through foreign 
exchange interventions.  
 
Table 8 
Dependent variable: VNER_CLOSE  
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) – Normal distribution 
  Coefficient  Std error  z-statistic  Prob  
C 7.36E-05  6.56E-05  1.120978  0.2623 
VNER_OPEN 0.440730  0.040133  10.98177 0.0000 
INT –1.07E-05  6.23E-05  –0.170853  0.8643 
VEMBI(–1) 0.002466  0.000459  5.371341  0.0000 
VNER_CLOSE(–1) –0.188469  0.033618  –5.606130  0.0000 
APREC*CV –0.023741  0.001598  –14.85839  0.0000 
DEPREC*CV 0.018136  0.001961  9.247301  0.0000 
  Variance equation 
C 8.50E-07  4.92E-08  17.27792  0.0000 
RESID(–1)^2 0.149999  0.046262  3.242358  0.0012 
GARCH(–1) 0.599987  0.023065  26.01239  0.0000 
INT –6.74E-07  4.88E-08  –13.82739  0.0000 
VEMBI(–1) 5.49E-06  1.81E-08  303.9510  0.0000 
R-squared  0.647856  Mean dependent var  –0.000146 
Adjusted R-squared 0.643636  SD dependent var  0.001911 
F-statistic 153.5350  Durbin-Watson stat  2.223919 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000     
Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors and covariance. 
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Challenges for monetary control and sterilisation 
Two factors have contributed to the monetary and macroeconomic management of reserves: 
•  Fiscal policy. In a context of strong growth of private consumption and private 
investment, the improvement observed in the fiscal stance has helped to offset 
potential demand pressures on inflation. The increase in tax revenues, due to higher 
export prices and the dynamism of economic activity and complemented by prudent 
public spending management, has allowed an increase in the public sector surplus 
to 3.1% of GDP in 2007 (Graph 9).  
Graph 9 
Overall balance of the public sector 
As a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
  Moreover, the accumulation of resources has given the authorities scope to respond 
effectively, without affecting credibility, in the case of a reversal of capital inflows to 
smooth the cost in economic activity. 
  The improvement in the fiscal stance has also helped to reduce exchange rate 
appreciation pressures linked to current account surpluses and capital inflows. On the 
one hand, disciplined fiscal expenditure reduces demand in non-tradable sectors, 
curbing real exchange rate appreciation. On the other, the resources coming from an 
increase in the surplus of the government’s overall balance are being deposited at the 
central bank, reducing the need to sterilise foreign exchange market intervention.  
  The government has also made efforts to improve its external position by prepaying 
and replacing external debt with domestic debt, helping to recycle foreign inflows. 
  Public debt as a percentage of GDP has been reduced from 46.7% in 2002 to 
29.2% in 2007. This is mostly explained by the reduction in the public external debt 
from 36.5% of GDP in 2002 to 18.4% in 2007 (Graph 10). 
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Graph 10  
Public debt  




































































































Source: Ministry of Finance and Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
•  De-dollarisation. The de-dollarisation process has contributed to the central bank’s 
monetary policy management. The resulting increase in the demand for domestic 
currency has reduced the necessity for sterilisation. During the last five years, the 
financial dollarisation ratio has been reduced from 65% in 2002 to 46% in 2007. In 
terms of GDP, the private sector broad money in domestic currency has maintained 
an increasing tendency while foreign currency broad money has been decreasing 























1993  1995  1997 1999 2001 2003 2005  2007 
Domestic currency





Year  Broad money of the 
banking system 
Credit of the banking 
system to the  
private sector 
Credit of the financial 
system to the  
private sector 
1993  69 76 77 
1994  64 74 74 
1995  63 71 72 
1996  67 74 72 
1997  65 77 75 
1998  69 80 79 
1999  70 82 82 
2000  70 82 81 
2001  67 80 78 
2002  65 79 76 
2003  62 77 73 
2004  55 74 71 
2005  55 70 67 
2006  51 63 60 
2007  46 60 57 
Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
 
  The injections of liquidity related to foreign exchange purchases by the central bank 
are sterilised through the issuance of central bank CDs (CDBCRPs). However, 
intervention, even when sterilised, can generate some challenges in terms of 
monetary management.
7 In particular the central bank needs to monitor the 
functioning of the transmission channels, control of the operating targets and 
sterilisation costs.  
•  Operating target. The central bank formally adopted the inflation targeting 
framework in 2002, and uses the interbank interest rate as an operating target. 
Since then, interest rate volatility has fallen dramatically, to one third of the volatility 
of the three previous years (Graph 12). This lower volatility will be transmitted to the 
other interest rates in the economy, reducing uncertainty of the returns in domestic 
assets, and thus reinforcing the de-dollarisation process. 
  Thus sterilisation operations have allowed the interbank rate to become permanently 
aligned to the policy reference rate (Graph 13). 
                                                  
7   See Mohanty and Turner (2006) and Alberola and Serena (2007).  BIS Papers No 44  381
 
 
Graph 12  
Interbank interest rate 











Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
Graph 13 
Foreign exchange interventions, reference  












Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
•  Interest rate transmission channel. Massive sterilisation through market instruments 
may cause upward pressures on the interest rate, as economic agents ask for a 
higher return for central bank CDs. In this case the yield curve will lose its 
connection with the monetary policy stance reflected in the reference rate, 
weakening the transmission channels. 
  The evolution of the short- and medium term interest rates reveals that this risk has 
not materialised in Peru. The average rate of the CDBCRPs has followed the 
reference rate during sterilisation episodes, so upward pressures do not seem 






















































































































































































5.5  Foreign exchange intervention
Reference interest rate
Interbank interest rate

















Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
•  Crowding out. The issuance of central bank CDs to sterilise liquidity injections due to 
foreign exchange interventions could reduce the resources for securities issued by 
the private sector. However, central bank issuance of CDBCRPs has not been an 
obstacle to the development of the domestic capital market. Private bond issuance, 
even though still small, has been continuously increasing during the last few years. 
Thus, the stock of bonds of the private sector has grown around 20% during the last 
two years (2004–06), and 41% in domestic currency. 
•  Rollover risk. In order to reduce refinancing risk, average maturity has been 
increasing. Up to 2001 there were no maturities higher than one year; now 
maturities go up to three years (central government bonds have maturities up to 
30 years); thus, maturity has increased from 138 to 224 days between 2001 and 
2007 (Graph 15). Furthermore, there has been a diversification of maturities to 
encourage the development of a short-run yield curve (Graph 16).  
Graph 15 
Average maturity of CDBCRP securities 
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Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
•  Sterilisation costs. If there is a positive differential between the interest rates 
associated with the liabilities and assets of its balance sheet, the central bank will 
incur quasi-fiscal costs. However, during the recent inflows episode, there have 
been no significant differences between international rates and the returns on 
CDBCRPs; thus, the financial position of the central bank has not been at stake 
(Graph 17). 
Graph 17 
CDBCRP interest rate, three-month Libor  
and central bank profits 
 
Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
In general, foreign exchange intervention and international reserve accumulation have been 
consistent with the inflation targeting scheme, considering that the inflation target has been 
achieved, foreign exchange interventions have been sterilised to keep the interbank interest 
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the exchange rate (Graph 18). However, it is important to continuously assess the risks 
related to foreign exchange intervention and specifically the impact on inflation expectations, 


















Source: National Institute of Statistics. 
The role of reserve requirements 
The Central Reserve Bank of Peru communicates its monetary policy stance using its 
“Nuevos Soles” policy rate, targeting the interbank overnight interest rate through open 
market operations. However, as previously mentioned, the second pillar of this monetary 
policy framework comprises policies implemented in order to reduce the vulnerabilities 
related to large speculative capital inflows or shortages linked to international financial crises 
by controlling the liquidity and solvency risks associated with financial dollarisation. These 
measures complement and preserve the sound management of the inflation target-oriented 
monetary policy. 
To deal with these risks, the BCRP limits balance sheet effects by pre-emptive accumulation 
of international reserves and by moderating the volatility of the exchange rate. However, high 
levels of international reserves could induce moral hazard behaviour among economic 
agents given that they may assign higher probabilities to the central bank’s use of reserves 
to provide liquidity during critical situations, and the financial system may fail to internalise 
dollarisation risks.  
Consequently, in Peru, from the beginning of the 1990s
8 the use of higher reserve 
requirements as a tool for managing foreign currency monetary aggregates, compared to the 
reserve requirement ratio for domestic currency at the minimum level, allowed the central 
bank to sterilise large capital inflows and to control the availability of lending funds of the 
financial system, helping to preserve appropriate levels of loans to the private sector in a way 
compatible with macroeconomic stability and sustainable economic growth. Additionally, the 
raising of bank liabilities in foreign currency required increasing holdings of liquid assets at 
appropriate levels to confront sudden reversals of capital inflows. 
Reserve requirements on foreign currency deposits, and the interest rate paid on these 
reserves, are also used as instruments to prevent the expansion of monetary aggregates 
                                                  
8   As summarised in Quispe (2000).  
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denominated in foreign currency. The foreign currency reserve ratio is important because 
Peru is subject to large capital inflows. Although approximately 75% of these capital flows 
are estimated to be long-term, the scale of inflows is still large enough to threaten monetary 
stability. 
The foreign currency reserve ratio can also act as a buffer against a sudden reversal of these 
inflows and can encourage the public to hold domestic currency. However, the ratio is not 
changed systematically for monetary policy purposes and remains a supplementary device. 
In 1993, the marginal reserve requirement for foreign currency deposits was 45%; it was 
reduced to 35% and 20% in October and December 1998, respectively; and increased to 
30% in November 2004. Additionally, since April 2004 the reserve requirements in foreign 
currency have been extended to the credit lines received by domestic banks from overseas 
financial institutions. At the beginning of 2008, due to significant short-term capital inflows, 
the central bank strengthened its position by increasing reserve requirements. As of May 
2008, the minimum reserve requirement ratio was 8.5% for both domestic and foreign 
currency bank liabilities, and the marginal reserve requirement ratio was 25% for domestic 
currencies and 45% for foreign currencies. Furthermore, the BCRP established a 120% 
marginal reserve requirement for non-resident deposit holdings in the domestic financial 
system. 
Required reserves are remunerated at an interest rate related to Libor and are computed on 
the basis of monthly averages. These reserves comprise banks’ vault cash holdings and 
demand deposits at the central bank. The combined effects of the marginal and the minimum 
legal requirements implied, by the end of 1993, effective reserve requirement ratios of 43% 
and 12.1% for foreign and domestic deposits, respectively; this had decreased to 30.1% and 
6.4% respectively by December 2007 (Graph 19).  
Graph 19 
Commercial banks: effective reserve requirement  
ratio in domestic and foreign currencies 
In percentage points 
 
Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
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Peru and the current global financial crisis 
Since August 2007, triggered by the subprime crisis in the United States, the global financial 
system has been facing a financial turmoil. The turmoil deepened from mid-September 2008 
due to the generalised liquidity squeeze and stoppage of credit lines, pushing the industrial 
economies into recession, and implying greater uncertainty regarding commodity prices, 
interest rates and exchange rates. This crisis is also affecting the developing economies, 
with downward growth pressures on China, India, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and 
the transition economies. Although Latin America has actually shown a dynamic economic 
activity, the continent’s economies have begun to face tight financial conditions. Peru has 
maintained its dynamic pace with high growth rates (9.3% forecast for 2008), and the 
inflation rate, although one of the lowest in Latin America (6.7% projected for 2008), has 
been addressed by the central bank, with gradual adjustments of its monetary policy 
stance – six 25 basis point increases of the policy rate from 5.0% in December 2007 to 6.5% 
in September 2008, aiming for a gradual return to the inflation target level of 2% in 2010, 
according to the central bank’s Inflation Report of September 2008. 
However, in October and November 2008 the Central Reserve Bank of Peru paused its 
adjustment process, reorienting its efforts to ensure liquidity in the domestic financial system 
and to reduce the extreme volatility of the exchange rate in order to offset possible negative 
balance sheet effects in a partially dollarised economy. Strong macroeconomic fundamentals 
and the preventive accumulation of international reserves allowed the central bank a high 
capacity of response to face situations of international turbulence. In the actual context of 
tight international liquidity, Peru observed a reversal of foreign investors’ positions in 
domestic currency, and the central bank intervened in the exchange market, selling dollars in 
order to prevent any perverse effects. Furthermore, the central bank expanded its range of 
monetary operations in order to provide financial entities with greater flexibility to manage 
their liquidity in new soles and dollars. In addition, since October 2008 the reserve 
requirement rates in soles and dollars have been reduced, and credit lines from abroad have 
been exempted from reserve requirements. 
Conclusions 
Recent capital inflows to Peru are mainly explained by an increase in foreign direct 
investment and long-term debt. This behaviour has been strongly related to structural 
reforms and better macroeconomic management, which accounts for stable inflows of long-
term capital, even during periods of financial crises. In this sense, our estimations show the 
high importance of macroeconomic stability as a determinant of long-term capital inflows, 
through indicators of fiscal and monetary discipline and financial stability.  
Even though sterilised intervention may generate several risks to monetary control, foreign 
exchange intervention and international reserve accumulation have been consistent with the 
inflation targeting scheme.  
The Central Reserve Bank of Peru has successfully met its inflation goals in this environment 
of capital inflows. The yearly inflation average was 2.0% from the implementation of the 
inflation targeting scheme in 2002 until 2006, and during 2007 it was among the lowest rates 
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